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                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                     EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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    EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.,
                                        16-CV-1390(PKC)
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              Plaintiff
6
               -against- :
7
                                        United States Courthouse
                                        Brooklyn, New York
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    CHARLES S. HOLMES and
    ASSET MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES
9
    OF NEW YORK, INC.
                                        May 18, 2021
              Defendant. :
                                        2:00 p.m.
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                TRANSCRIPT OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE VIA VIDEO
                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAMELA K. CHEN
13
                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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    APPEARANCES:
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    produced by computer-aided transcription.
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THE CLERK: Civil cause for a pretrial conference. 1 2 Docket 16-CV-1390. 3 Before asking the parties to state their 4 appearances, I would like to note the following. Persons 5 granted remote access to proceedings are reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording and 6 7 rebroadcasting of court proceedings. Violation of these 8 prohibitions may result in sanctions, including removal of 9 court-issued media credentials, restricted entry to future 10 hearings, denial of entry to future hearings or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. 11 12 Will the parties please state their appearances for 13 the record, starting with plaintiff. 14 MR. LESSER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 15 Leonard Lesser of Simon Lesser, P.C. for the 16 plaintiff, Emerson Electric Company. 17 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 MR. KAZAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 19 Barry Kazan of Mintz & Gold for Defendant Charlie With me is Carli Aberle. 20 Holmes. We've been advised to file a notice of appearance 21 22 for Ms. Aberle, which we will take care of, but she would not 23 have been able to do it before last week, as she just was 24 admitted to the Eastern District of New York. 25 THE COURT: Congratulations.

All right. Good afternoon to both of you.

So we are here for an initial pretrial conference in anticipation of trial in this matter. What we are going to do is go over the joint pretrial order that has been proposed by the parties to address issues that can possibly be resolved today or at least should be discussed initially. I also am going to explain more about the additional briefing that I think needs to be done before trial itself. But we will set a date for trial. Obviously, it is going to be very far out, given our current situation, and then we will set dates related to pretrial briefing that has to be done before we start trial.

So hopefully you have in front of you the joint pretrial order. I want to start out by clarifying a couple of the defenses that Mr. Kazan -- is it Kazan? I'm sorry.

Mr. Kazan, that you have put in the joint pretrial order.

One of the things you argue is that the plaintiff's Section 276 claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. I guess I am wondering why this was not the subject of -- or should not be the subject of a motion as opposed to something that is tried to the jury. Explain to me more what it is you think this defense is and what facts it relies upon, if any.

MR. KAZAN: The defense is that the specific conveyances that would have been attacked would have been

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dealing with conveyances that occurred more than six years prior to the commencement of this action and there has been some -- I would say a little bit of confusion on our part as to a couple of the conveyances that were brought up at various But there's also, I believe, a discovery rule that does potentially impact the statute of limitations defense, which I believe Mr. Lesser -- and he can certainly speak for Emerson -- has suggested that would fall under the two-year discovery rule. So I believe we made the decision not to move for summary judgment on that basis because the question would be, one, the timing of the specific conveyances that are being opposed, one of which -- or several of which may have occurred prior to six years. And then, two, certainly on the issue of the discovery rule, I am not sure that's an issue that would have been able to be resolved on summary judgment because I believe we would have had a different version of the facts.

THE COURT: Well, the transactions, Mr. Lesser, that are the subject of -- or I guess conveyances that are the subject of this lawsuit, what is the time frame involved, according to your theory of the case?

MR. LESSER: The transfers that are the subject of the fraudulent conveyance claims all occurred during the underlying litigation, generally 2008 through 2010, but like Mr. Kazan just said, there is the discovery rule. We didn't get disclosure of these transfers until after the AMA

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bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed and Mr. Holmes responded to the post judgment discovery. Remember that after the first judgment was docketed, I served post judgment discovery requests and information subpoenas, restraining orders, you know, all the typical post judgment discovery devices to find the assets. And shortly thereafter, shortly after those were served, AMA filed for involuntary bankruptcy in the Eastern District -- in New Jersey and then it went through the procedural motions to bring it to the Eastern District of New York before Chief Bankruptcy Judge Carla Craig, who ultimately dismissed the bankruptcy proceeding. And we didn't -- and then once the stay was lifted, then Mr. Kazan, on behalf of Mr. Holmes, started responding to the post judgment discovery all well within two years of the filing of the complaint. So I don't think there really is any issue on that. We didn't have access to the AMA bank records in connection with the underlying litigation, so we didn't see the money trail and all the conveyances until after we got that disclosure, which was within the two years of the filing of the complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. So it does seem to me that at trial there is going to be some evidence produced regarding the actual discovery of these allegedly fraudulent conveyances. That is going to be necessary for the plaintiff in order to defeat this statute of limitations defense.

Is that fair to say, Mr. Lesser?

MR. LESSER: I would say I really don't think there's a legitimate dispute as to when we first got discovery of the fraudulent conveyances and the transfers. I'm happy to work through that with Mr. Kazan. I really don't see how there really could be any legitimate dispute as to when those materials were first produced which postdated the bankruptcy proceeding being dismissed, so I'm hoping maybe he and I can work that out. Otherwise, I mean, it's his burden of proof on the affirmative defense of statute of limitations and I'll just present, you know, an opposition, his letters to me with the disclosures and when I can come pick up the boxes of documents. I mean, I don't really think this should be something that's in dispute. I'm hoping that we can work it out.

THE COURT: Mr. Kazan, what do you say to that? Are there facts that really need to be found by a jury?

MR. KAZAN: At this moment, Your Honor, I think there are. I don't think it's simply the question of when the actual documents were produced to Mr. Lesser. For example, one of the conveyances that are raised here is the transfer from Mr. Holmes -- Asset Management Associates acquired CS -- the company CSI. One of the transactions that's noted in your opinion as been raised in Mr. Lesser's expert report is that transfer from Asset Management Associates to Mr. Holmes as a

7 transfer. So in addition, there are issues that I think we 1 2 intend to raise with respect to the filing of the bankruptcy, 3 both in terms of the timing of the bankruptcy as well as 4 Emerson's decisions within the bankruptcy that go to the equitable estoppel defenses such that it's likely that these 5 6 issues will still, you know, arise. 7 But certainly Mr. Lesser and I -- and hopefully 8 he'll agree with this statement -- we've been fairly 9 cooperative in terms of timing, deadlines, and trying to work issues out. And we have discussed the fact that we do want to 10 11 try to narrow some of this down, you know, in terms of the 12 documents and potential testimony and, you know, objections. 13 And so, you know, understanding that we may, due to the 14 Court's schedule, have the time to do some of that, I would 15 intend to, you know, engage in that exercise. So I won't 16 foreclose it, but I do think it's a little broader than what 17 Mr. Lesser has said. 18 MR. KAZAN: I'm happy, Your Honor, to just briefly 19 respond. 20 The only thing I would say is, in connection with 21 the transfer of CSI to Mr. Holmes which took place after the 22 closing, two points on that. 23 One, we didn't get documentation regarding that transfer until discovery in this case in 2017. 24

And two, that transfer is not the subject in and of

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itself of a fraudulent conveyance claim. The transfer will be evidence submitted in connection with the alter-ego liability component of the claim, but it is not part of the discrete fraudulent conveyance claims that we're pursuing. So I really don't see how that raise -- you know, impacts the alleged statute of limitations defense on the fraudulent conveyance claims.

And with respect to the bankruptcy and actions in the bankruptcy, I mean, I don't see how that impacts statute of limitations. There was a bankruptcy that was filed and ultimately it was dismissed on Emerson's motion. Emerson acted as aggressively as possible to get the bankruptcy dismissed so that the stay could be lifted so that we could get the discovery that then led to the information regarding the fraudulent transfers that we did ultimately include in the complaint that was filed in 2016.

So those are my brief responses. I am hoping that Mr. Kazan and I can confer about that. I think that there really shouldn't be an issue with respect to those discrete matters.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I mean, I will leave it to the parties to discuss this further to see if you can come to some resolution, though it sounds like the plaintiff's idea of a resolution is that this defense goes away because there is no factual predicate for it, whereas it does not

sound like Mr. Kazan agrees with that. So I am not sure you will be able to negotiate the affirmative defense away.

I think though the question becomes whether or not there is any potential evidence that the defense could bring to bear on or support this affirmative defense, as it will have to do at trial, and then it may be a matter of a motion in limine I guess by the plaintiff to preclude any argument with respect to an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations if you think there is no evidence that would support that.

MR. LESSER: And that's exactly what I would like to do. Maybe at the very least, the confer -- meet and confer that I do with Mr. Kazan can isolate at least some of the factual allegations that support this defense because it's going to be the defense's burden of proof on that. And maybe just like you said, Your Honor, I'd present a motion in limine so we can limit the jury's time on that matter and you could make a ruling as a matter of law on anything that's appropriate with respect to the defense.

THE COURT: Right. I think if you folks cannot work it out and if the defense still wants to pursue this statute of limitations argument and the plaintiff thinks there is no basis for doing so, that will have to be resolved via motion in limine, or at least subject to one if it does not get resolved that way.

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The second issue I wanted to raise with the defense is this allusion to equitable reasons under the *Brunswick* defense as a means of defeating the 276 claim. I just want to understand, what exactly does that refer to? And again, what would it mean for the evidentiary presentation by the defense or I guess on cross of the plaintiff's case?

MR. KAZAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The issue with the equitable defense -- and, you know, it has been referred to as the Brunswick doctrine by us, you know, relying on that case, but it really just boils down to an equitable estoppel argument that there are certain indicia by Emerson's conduct that should preclude it from seeking to recover from Mr. Holmes. And so those issues are such that Mr. Holmes has testified, and Mr. Switzer, who is a representative of Emerson, have testified as to what the parties' intentions were at the time of the AMA contract and whether Mr. Holmes's individual liability was ever contemplated under that agreement under facts such as these, given the fact that AMA -- and sort of goes back to the same issue. AMA -- our position was that AMA could not hold CSI as an S-corp holding another corporation because of certain tax rules that would have endangered the S-corp status, that Mr. Holmes had made Emerson aware of that and that, as a result, the company ultimately was freestanding as CSI and Emerson and CSI engaged in a course of conduct over years

where Emerson knew that they were dealing with CSI.

And so there's a lot to -- you know, there may be a lot to unpack there, you know, and obviously we'll attempt to streamline the presentation for the jury so that they can understand it, but effectively it's this idea that the defense should preclude Emerson from recovering, especially in an area where you're arguing an intent to defraud, when Mr. Holmes's testimony is going to be that everyone understood what this deal was and everyone understood what the exposure was going to be, in addition to a couple of contractual provisions that in our view potentially limit recoveries, which we don't know what the jury may ultimately find, you know, which is why we did not move for summary judgment on that, as well as the nature of third-party liabilities within the contract.

THE COURT: Did you want to say anything about that, Mr. Lesser?

MR. LESSER: Oh, certainly.

So this equitable defense -- and I believe your decision issued last August, Your Honor, made clear that whether it's pleaded as the equitable estoppel or the equitable reasons, the *Brunswick* reasons, it's still the essence, this equitable estoppel defense which is predicated on the *Brunswick* decision and the allegation that they're -- you know, this entity, AMA, is allegedly like the entity, subject entity in *Brunswick* was some sort of shell, not a real

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company and, you know, we knew that going in, that kind of thing. I mean, we'll address those obviously as it pertains to the equitable claim for alter-ego liability.

As to the legal claim of fraudulent conveyance, the defense has no application as a matter of law. equitable defense to alter-ego liability. It is not a defense to a fraudulent conveyance claim because the fraudulent conveyance claims obviously flow not from whatever the parties' statements and course of dealing was in the underlying transaction; the fraudulent conveyance claims flow from the transfers of money from the judgment debtor to Mr. Holmes. And there's no case that applies a Brunswick-style equitable estoppel defense to alter-ego liability to add a fraudulent conveyance claim. And that's the point. While the equitable claim of alter-ego liability relies in part on the fraudulent transfers as a function of the wrongs component of alter-ego liability, the standalone claims of constructive and intentional fraudulent conveyances is not subject to this *Brunswick* defense and that's pretty clear.

And if we need to, you know, further brief that in the motion in limine, we will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So it seems that you acknowledge that there may be some applicability of this *Brunswick* defense to the equitable claim of piercing the -- or rather of the alter

ego aspect of your claims against Mr. Holmes, but you are saying it has no applicability to the Section 276 liability that you are claiming here; in other words, the fraudulent conveyance liability? Is that --

MR. LESSER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LESSER: That's correct.

And, I mean, we briefed the issue as to why I don't think the equitable estoppel applies to the alter-ego liability. Your Honor said they're issues of fact, that's fine. But that's separate and discrete from the fraudulent conveyance claims, one of them being the 276 intentional fraudulent conveyance claim.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Kazan, how are you intending to argue this? Were you intending to argue the *Brunswick* defense only in connection with the alter-ego liability claim or are you going to argue it as to the Section 276 claim in general?

MR. KAZAN: We intended to argue both, Your Honor.

I know the issue is briefed. I don't think Your Honor -- I do
think it was addressed under 273-a.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KAZAN: But I don't think it was addressed under 276. Obviously, you know, when you're talking about intent to defraud and you're arguing that the other side didn't rely on these situations, it appears that it would be relevant for

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that decision whether it's characterized as a true affirmative defense or whether it's characterized as evidence of a lack of intent that meets 276. Because 276 is an intentional statute. 273, you know, effectively is a strict liability statute in this context. The context being that shareholder loans, repayments under the version of the -- I want to call it the uniform transaction under 273-a that existed at the time essentially said, you know, an insider cannot get the benefit of a transferee in good faith. The issue with 276 is, because it's an intent to defraud, we believe we can apply it. And we did cite cases in the underlying briefing, you know, where, for example, even Magistrate Locke was dealing with a case dealing with equitable defense as to legal claims. And so I know that's Ms. Emerson's position in this case, but I don't know that it's settled such that it's not -- that it couldn't be presented to the jury in some fashion.

THE COURT: Well, I am looking at that portion of the decision where I addressed this *Brunswick* defense and unless I was mistaken at the time I issued the decision, I characterize Holmes's affirmative defense as the plaintiff should be equitably estopped from piercing AMA's corporate veil because when plaintiff contracted with defendants, it knew that AMA was effectively a dummy corporation that Holmes had created solely as a vehicle to carry out the deal and to shield Holmes from personal liability. So unless I

mischaracterized the defense's argument, it seemed to me that you argued, at least in the context of the summary judgment motion, this *Brunswick* defense exclusively or at least focused it very narrowly on the alter ego or piercing the corporate veil issue because it relates -- it seems to me the case itself relates to this notion of piercing the corporate veil and then the defendant's personal liability.

So I think what is going to have to happen here is that the plaintiff is going to have to file a motion in limine if, Mr. Lesser, you want to preclude the defense from arguing more generally that the Section 276 claim or any liability under Section 276 can be defeated by this *Brunswick* defense, an equitable defense.

Now, maybe there is no daylight between those two issues -- I just do not remember all that well -- and whether or not Mr. Holmes's personal liability is really the -- you know, would answer the question of Section 276 liability or some, you know, fraudulent conveyance under 276.

But, Mr. Lesser, if you think that for some reason the defense should not be allowed to argue this beyond being a defense to the alter-ego argument or liability of Mr. Holmes, you should put that in a motion in limine so that we could resolve that before trial and, you know, decide what -- so I can decide whether or not that argument can even be made to the jury.

MR. LESSER: Yeah, I think that's fine and I'm happy to do that.

I would just briefly respond that the whole notion of the equitable estoppel defense to alter-ego liability articulated in *Brunswick* was exactly how you framed it in your decision, Judge, which is an equitable theory based upon the alleged disclosure and knowledge of a purported dummy corporation being used as a vehicle for an acquisition as opposed to it being something more than that. We addressed that issue. That's fine, I can readdress it.

But with respect to the fraudulent -- intention of fraudulent conveyance claim, what I don't think Mr. Kazan correctly characterized was that with respect to a 276 claim, it's not like you present evidence that there was an intentional fraud committed as a result of the fraudulent transfers, you present evidence to the badges of fraud, right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LESSER: And if you have multiple badges of fraud and those badges of fraud are the close relationship between the parties to the con- -- acting in the normal course of a transaction and the inadequacy of consideration, things like that. If there are multiple badges, then there is clear and convincing evidence of actual intent. So I don't even see how the concepts that the *Brunswick* court is addressing vis-a-vis allegations that the corporate acquirer was a dummy,

how that would even apply to post acquisition fraudulent transfers and the allegations that they were intentional based upon the badges of fraud for those post acquisition transfers.

And that's the point. And I'm happy to address that in a motion in limine to the extent that the Court feels that it should be addressed, which I do. I think that it should be pulled away from a jury so that you can look at that legal issue and see how that defense should be applied to the extent that the defense presents its burden -- you know, meets his burden of proof to establish it.

THE COURT: Well, and one thing to consider with respect to these affirmative defenses, and I do not know the answer to this, is that oftentimes what will happen is the jury has to make certain findings of fact that are set forth in a special verdict sheet and then I would make a legal determination based on those findings of fact about the applicability of a defense. That obviously arises in different context. I do not know if that is the proper way of handling these two affirmative defenses, the statute of limitations as well as the equitable defense as to alter ego, but that is something that the parties will have to sort of apprise me of or argue about if there is disagreement.

But I do want to say --

MR. LESSER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Hang on.

I do want to say, Mr. Kazan, that at least right now all I found in the summary judgment decision was that there were issues of fact about what alter-ego theory that the plaintiff is pursuing, but I do not think I resolved it and I do not think it was added to the fact that it could be a defense to the 276 claim. And I think in part, for the reasons that Mr. Lesser says, that it is -- I do not think the original defense was intended to do that and I am not sure that it is a match between the facts that would give rise to the defense and those that would defeat a 276 claim.

But like I said, I think the plaintiff should maybe articulate that in a motion in limine.

Mr. Lesser, you do not have to reargue the point about the applicability as to the alter ego. Obviously, that issue possibly can be argued to the jury. Although, if you think the more proper way to deal with it is for me to make that determination posttrial, facts found by the jury, then you can make that argument as well.

MR. LESSER: And I was just going to suggest that very thing, Your Honor, especially given the fact the alter-ego claim is an equitable -- it's a claim that has to be crafted and that it is the proper way in which it will claim the sheet which will have factual determinations for the trier of facts that then you as the court of equity will then rule upon in a decision based upon the facts found by the fact

19 finder. 1 2 Right. I think that makes sense. That THE COURT: 3 may not be true of the statute of limitations issue, but --4 MR. LESSER: Correct. THE COURT: But that would be subject to a different 5 6 briefing --7 MR. LESSER: Yes. 8 THE COURT: -- at any rate because of the reasons 9 that you said earlier, Mr. Lesser, that there are no facts 10 that you think the jury can find or would find that would support an affirmative defense. 11 12 Turning to page 10 of the joint pretrial Okay. 13 order, both sides are requesting a jury trial. I alluded to 14 this earlier that as --15 (Audio dropped; Reporter asks the Court to repeat.) 16 THE COURT: So as I alluded to earlier, this case 17 will not be tried any time soon and, as you can appreciate, 18 jury trials have been backed up as a result of the pandemic 19 and we only recently started doing criminal jury trials a 20 couple of weeks ago in April. So you will not see a trial 21 until 2022 if you want a jury trial and I think even summer of 22 2022 might be ambitious. Because even though we might be able 23 to do more than the number of trials we are doing now, which 24 is two at a time, we cannot be expected to constantly be 25 picking juries and so things will not fully open up again for

a while.

So I guess I ask the parties to consider whether or not a bench trial -- if you will consider a bench trial, especially because the issues had been narrowed so much by the summary judgment decision and by the default of AMA. So you do not need to answer now, but I would give it some thought, depending on your interest in getting this case resolved sooner rather than sometime next year and probably late next year.

MR. LESSER: Your Honor, if I may?

What would be your best guesstimate today, if we did a bench trial, when you think it could be slotted in or at least to commence?

THE COURT: I have no idea.

I can tell you this, that right now at the rate of two trials every two weeks, which is the jury selection period, we have criminal trials scheduled from now until the end of 2021, and so that means no civil trials will be happening. Now, it is possible that we will have the potential to pick some civil juries between now and the end of the year. But again, because we cannot run a nonstop jury selection process, it is just not possible even under the best of times; I do not think we are going to be doing many civil jury trials this year, if any. So then you are talking about the backlog of civil trials, of which there are many, many.

And so I would think maybe late next year would be a safe estimate. Sometime fall or later in 2022 would be the earliest I would expect we would be able to try this case. Now, the age of the case contributes -- might bump us up a little bit, but probably not much.

MR. LESSER: I may not have been clear.

My question to you was if we decided to do a bench trial, what would be your best guesstimate today as to when you think it could be slotted?

THE COURT: My apologies. That was a very long, unnecessary explanation.

We could probably slot it any time before the fall. My deputy is on the call. We could do it in the summer. It is only going to be a week, roughly. And faster if we are not picking a jury; we could get it done, I bet, in five days. So any time in the summer.

MR. LESSER: Okay. That will be something that I would like to confer with my client and obviously with Mr. Kazan and we'll definitely consider that. That's a big swing in terms of timing and there is a lot of prejudgment interest that's attached, so maybe it does make sense to do that. So we'll confer on that issue.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. I mean, we could do it as early as June. July, less likely, but August as well are open. Right now I think August is wide open.

MR. LESSER: Okay.

THE COURT: But we could do June 5th, I was just told, if you guys want to start that early. It is up to you.

MR. LESSER: Thank you. We will confer on that for sure.

THE COURT: But there is some motion briefing, obviously, that would have to happen first and so I would suggest August, to be more realistic, so you could get all your briefing done and line up all your witnesses and get ready, you know, appropriately.

Okay. So moving on then. Let's talk about the witnesses that each of you have identified. Neither side explained what these witnesses would testify about, which are required typically. However, I imagine that if neither side was handicapped by that, because it seems to me you both know, I gather, who these different witnesses are and what they may be testifying about. But I do wonder if either side has an objection to any of these witnesses testifying. And I note that the defense does suggest a challenge to the plaintiff's expert, I believe, which is something that would have to be briefed before trial to be sure, and it is not going to happen in the middle of trial.

So any of objections to either side's witnesses?

MR. LESSER: None for the plaintiff. I mean,
obviously to the extent that there is going to be a challenge

to the plaintiff's expert, it will be concomitant to whatever that challenge is, but my witness list is relatively discrete to adverse witnesses and the plaintiff's expert, as well as the 30(b)(6) designee.

THE COURT: Okay. How about you, Mr. Kazan? Do you have any objection to the plaintiff's witnesses?

MR. KAZAN: No, Your Honor. I think what happened was the -- I think it's under the motions in limine that Mr. Lesser and I both sort of parroted each other's language as a sort of a precautionary issue, but I believe we're both familiar with all of these individuals who may testify at trial. I don't foresee a Daubert type exclusion in challenging Mr. Lazzara.

THE COURT: Okay. Now let me ask you, Mr. Lesser, because in your -- well, as Mr. Kazan just said, both of you have parallel language, apparently you parroted each other, suggesting you might challenge the other side's expert, but you are saying you are not going to do that, right?

MR. LESSER: Yes. Like Mr. Kazan, I don't expect a Daubert style challenge to Mr. Ashe based upon, you know, his credential.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So rather you are just going to challenge the bases of his opinion as argument to the jury or whoever the fact finder is?

MR. LESSER: Or the foundation, the evidentiary

foundation to the opinions that he proffers.

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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now let's turn then to the deposition testimony.

The plaintiff has identified quite a bit of deposition testimony it may seek to offer at trial. And the normal -- the way I have these designations dealt with, because I want to do it before trial, especially if we are having a jury trial because I want to avoid any battles in the midst of trial, is to have -- whichever side wants to use the testimony in the first instance, basically produce a copy of the deposition transcript and color code those portions that the plaintiff wants to use; and then the defense, or the opposing party, if it is the defense wants to use it, color code it in another shade, like a highlighter, as cross-designations. So obviously, as often happens, is the plaintiff will designate certain lines and then the defense will take the view that other lines or portions should be introduced for completeness or to avoid any confusion or misleading testimony being admitted. So whoever the moving party is has to produce a copy of the deposition transcript with a highlighted -- with the designations it wants highlighted in one color and then the defense will highlight in another color what it proposes to introduce, if the plaintiff gets to introduce their portions, and then any objections should also be noted. Now, the mechanics of that I

leave to you, but you could probably number them somehow and then recite what the objections of the arguments are on a separate document, because I do not think it will necessarily lend itself to doing so in the document. But at the end of the day, what I want is the deposition transcripts color coded with each side's designations and then some recitation of what the objections are to the other side's designations, so some brief articulation of it so that they can be addressed in a pretrial conference.

And I think this goes to some of the -- I think this goes to Holmes's section of the joint pretrial order about deposition designations. Because there is no specific designations in your section, Mr. Kazan, but it sounds like you may want to cross-designate portions and I want you to do that in the actual document that I mentioned and I want it to be done before trial so I could resolve any disputes before we actually start trial. Okay?

Any objection about that process? Okay.

MR. LESSER: The only thing I would raise is that with respect -- presumably with respect to the plaintiff's burden of proof on its case in chief, that's relatively straightforward; I color/highlight the case-in-chief stuff that I want in and Mr. Kazan will add or raise his objections. With respect to affirmative defenses where the burden is

shifted, how would you propose addressing that? Would it be the same thing where I just color code and he color codes and we kind of work that through?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LESSER: Okay.

THE COURT: But I assume that Mr. Kazan would start that process if, in fact, he is going to be eliciting certain evidence in the deposition testimony that he wants to introduce.

MR. LESSER: Right.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Kazan, if there is certain evidence that you want to elicit via deposition testimony or present via deposition testimony in support of your affirmative defenses, you should start that process, the designation process, with whatever transcripts you want to use and then Mr. Lesser can cross-designate. Okay? So whoever has the burden, start -- whoever wants to affirmatively use the evidence should start the deposition designation process.

But I just want to disabuse you guys of the notion that you can wait until the final pretrial conference to do that. We are going to get that done and resolved by the time of the final pretrial conference, which is going to be just a half a week before trial starts.

MR. LESSER: Understood.

MR. KAZAN: Understood, Your Honor.

May I ask a question on this point? Because the designations that are there are certainly of every witness who plans to be available in that trial. And so the question would be, if we are doing designations, assuming it is not a bench trial, is the custom in your court to read the designations to the jury, provide them -- or just provide it to them in writing?

THE COURT: You know, I let the parties decide how they want to present it.

So, I have had both done. Predominantly, it seems like parties have it read. So someone sits in the witness box, reads back the answers to a lawyer who reads the questions by the lawyer. So you can choose whatever format you like. Sometimes I think parties like to make sure the jury hears it. You know what I mean? Because you never know if they read it if you just submit it to them in writing. So that is why I think most parties -- and I understand this. I have done the same. I would probably have it read in as if the person were testifying. Okay.

MR. KAZAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And obviously the same rules will apply. You know, you cannot have your mock witness inflect in a certain way. And I have done extensive readings like that in trials. So you just have to maintain a relatively even tone, whoever the witness is, so as not to affect the impact of the

testimony unfairly. All right?

But if you want to submit it in writing and you are satisfied to do it that way just because you want to refer to it during closing argument and you just want it to be there, that is fine, too. So I am not going to prescribe how you do that. That is up to you.

MR. KAZAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now turning to the exhibits, which start on page 18.

First of all, plaintiff's exhibits, the defense has at least listed a lot of objections to a number of plaintiff's exhibits, certainly in the first 17 or so. And then the same is true with respect to Defendant Holmes's exhibits, plaintiff has raised some objections as well. What I would like you folks to do is to put those objections that will require some, you know, briefing into a motion in limine. So I am not going to deal with these, especially if we are in a jury trial, on the fly or as the exhibit is being offered.

So I note some of these are really prejudice and relevance objections, but I want you to explain or summarize this, even by category, what your objections are to certain exhibits being proffered by the other side. It would probably behoove you to talk to each other to make sure that the exhibit that you are objecting to is actually going to be offered as opposed to it was marked, you know, out of caution.

And then as part of your motions in limine, I would like you to brief your argument about why an exhibit should be precluded entirely or if you want a cautionary instruction to be given, whatever it is that you want to argue. If you do not, I will probably be less likely to grant some preclusion because I do not want to deal with it in the middle of a trial without having the time to think about it.

Now, obviously objections to, you know, questions asked to witnesses or how a document is characterized, you can make those, of course, during the trial itself. But it seems to me many of these, for example, decisions from other cases or declarations offered in other cases should be amenable to a written motion in terms of preclusion, so I would like you to do that in advance of trial.

MR. LESSER: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay?

So that applies to both sides.

And you can put them together if you would like because it seems to me some of these are similar kinds of exhibits, especially the decisions from what appear to be other cases. You can argue sort of as to exhibits, for example, 13 through 16 that the plaintiff seeks to offer the following argument to preclude them.

All right. And then we get to the motions in limine section. Neither side identified any, but obviously I have

30 1 given you a number of --2 MR. KAZAN: Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. KAZAN: I'm so sorry to interrupt. THE COURT: It's okay. 5 MR. KAZAN: We did identify one that we had not 6 7 discussed with -- well, it was in our -- it's in the pretrial 8 order, we have not fully discussed it, which is, there are 9 numerous references in various pleadings to the fact as to who 10 Mr. Holmes sold his house to that Mr. Lesser raised. And so 11 that is one issue that, you know, we flagged as not being appropriate for a preclusion order in advance. I don't know 12 13 if Mr. Lesser intended to actually raise it at trial, but it 14 is something that's contained in several of the documents that 15 he has listed as exhibits. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Lesser, do you intend to elicit this 17 information or present some evidence on whom Mr. Holmes sold 18 his prior residence to? 19 MR. LESSER: The answer to that was no, it's not 20 actually in any of the exhibits. To the extent that, you 21 know, that there was some news report articles, we're not going to offer those per se. To the extent that we offer 22 23 evidence of Mr. Holmes' bank statements and things like that, 24 I don't think they reflect the sale. My understanding, at 25 least from the recording, was that he set up some sort of LLC

for the purchase, but we didn't really get into that. So I wasn't offering those articles into evidence, but I'll confer with Mr. Kazan as to what his concerns are and try to work that through by stipulation.

THE COURT: Okay. If you can do that, great.

If not, obviously move, Mr. Kazan, for whatever motion in limine you think -- whatever limiting instruction you want on that or preclusion if Mr. Lesser indicates that he wants to talk about that subject.

Now, I have mentioned already that a number of areas have to be covered in motions in limine, so I am not going to reiterate those.

Is there anything else that you can think of now, given my general guidelines on how I like to proceed mainly to, you know, resolve as many issues as we can before we start trial, that you think should go into a motion in limine?

MR. LESSER: None for the plaintiff.

I would just say that I'd like to -- you know, we'll still confer, continue to confer. Maybe we can even get some more stipulations of fact to streamline further what's going to be presented to the jury and the specific questions we're going to have them deal with in the proposed special verdict sheet. And I'll start that process so that we can try to streamline this as much as possible.

THE COURT: Okay. So I guess here is a question.

And I know this requires you to maybe try to figure out what is in each other's minds, but if you think there is some chance that this could be -- that both sides will agree to a bench trial, we could try to set a schedule for all the briefing of the motions.

If you think it is more likely that we are going to have a jury trial, I am trying to figure out how best to handle this. Because I can give you a trial date in 2022, I just do not know -- and we can work backwards in terms of the briefing schedule. I just do not know how realistic even that exercise is. I would probably set it for the summer of 2022, in an optimistic sort of vein.

But do you have any thoughts I guess on basically whether you think you will agree on a bench trial or not?

MR. KAZAN: Your Honor, for the plaintiff -- sorry.

For the defendant, Mr. Holmes, I would suggest that it's unlikely. I do believe he is going to want to have a jury hear his case.

THE COURT: All right. That perhaps then answers the question. Why don't we set a date for summer of 2022. And who knows, I mean, it is impossible to predict how the circumstances surrounding us will change and what that means for the court and its processes, so let's just put it down for sometime maybe June or July in 2022, about a year from now.

Does anyone have any notion that they will be

unavailable in either of those months next year?

MR. LESSER: Yes, the only blackout that I'm going to have is going to be towards -- it's going to be surrounding when my kids are done with school because we were supposed to take a trip for their bar- and bat mitzvah last year, but then COVID. And so we were going to go this year, but now with the fighting that's happening, that's not happening. So I would be hesitant to do it in the beginning part of June. I would suggest July only if we're looking at the summer, this way I don't have to come to you and say, Your Honor, I need to adjust it further. So I would say mid-July if we're going to be looking at the summer of 2022. Obviously, if we can move it up, that would be great.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAZAN: And, Your Honor, similarly, my two children will now be graduating at the same time from college hopefully in June of next year, so.

THE COURT: Congratulations.

MR. KAZAN: Well, one will be celebrating their graduation and the other will have their graduation.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, I know, the whole world is topsy-turvey.

So how about July 11th as at least our scheduled trial date, and that way at least we can generate some briefing dates based on that.

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34
              July 11, 2022 to pick the jury and start the trial.
1
 2
              In terms of motions in limine, since there are quite
3
    a few, why don't we have those briefed six weeks before trial.
 4
              So, Fida, what date is that?
              THE CLERK: June 30th.
5
              THE COURT: June 30th?
6
7
              THE CLERK: May 30th.
8
              THE COURT:
                          May 30th. May 30th, that makes sense.
9
              Do you know if that is Memorial Day?
10
              MR. KAZAN:
                          That is Memorial Day.
                               So let's make it before then
11
              THE COURT: Ah.
    because it is still a lot of time. So why don't we make it
12
13
    the week before then, May 23rd. So that will be the date.
14
              Is that all right?
              MR. KAZAN: Actually, I may have spoken too quickly.
15
16
    I saw that it was the last Monday in May and I assumed that
17
    was Memorial Day, but I think that's right.
18
              Ms. Aberle is nodding her head.
19
              MR. LESSER: Yeah, May 30, 2022 is Memorial Day.
20
              THE COURT: Okay. So let's make it May 23. And why
21
    don't we make that kind of an omnibus due date so you only
22
    have one deadline. So that is for the motions in limine as
23
    well as the deposition designations.
24
              And then each side will have two weeks to respond to
25
    the motions in limine, which would put us in June, I think
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June 6th or 7th.

Is that right, Fida, from May 23rd?

THE CLERK: Yes, June 6th.

THE COURT: Okay. So June 6th it will be due.

And then one week if you want to reply, but you do not have to. And that will be June 13th.

And then why don't we make the 13th the date upon which the proposed jury charges should be submitted.

And we will put out on the -- well, actually, let me say this. You do not have to provide any sort of standard instructions like burden of proof or credibility or the whole process by which the jury has to deliberate, et cetera. Just focus on the claims, obviously the 273-a and the 276 claims, and what those elements are and what the jury needs to find in terms of the elements and then of course the alter ego and then anything else you think that relates to the claims in this case.

And the way I would like you to do that, too, is to produce a joint submission. So to the extent that you agree on any instructions, just have that set forth. And then if you disagree, indicate defense's position, plaintiff's position, sort of stacked, so that way we have one document that we can use, that my law clerk can use to produce the final instructions.

And then we will ask you to send that to us in Word

37 because I would like to get it all done before that trip. 1 2 we don't need to, you know, push back those deadlines. You 3 know, we can keep the dates that you suggested for the 4 pretrial submissions. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Kazan, are you fine with that? MR. KAZAN: I am, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. So all the dates that we have 8 just discussed will stay the same. The trial date will move 9 to July 18th. And then two weeks before that, which should be July 4th --10 11 THE CLERK: June 27th. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 We will make it June 27th. That will be the date on 14 which you submit your proposed voir dire and also a list of 15 names and terms that could be referenced during the trial so 16 that we could provide it to the court reporters. So basically 17 you are looking for unique spellings or unusual spellings. 18 And also just remember in your proposed voir dire to 19 include the names of everyone who might be referenced during 20 the trial, or places if that is relevant at all, so that we 21 can make sure that we have jurors -- that you pick jurors who, 22 you know, do not have unique familiarity with either people or 23 places that are relevant to the trial. 24 Fida, I think I have covered everything, right?

The one other thing --

25

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1
              THE CLERK: I think --
 2
              THE COURT: Oh, sorry.
 3
              The one other thing I will say is that we will post
 4
    my standard, what I call, peremptory challenge questions.
5
    Things like: Are you married or do you have a partner? What
    do you do for a living? Where do you live? You know, county
6
7
    and borough. That sort of stuff we will put online so you do
8
    not need to -- when I say online, we will docket it so that
9
    you will see what my standard questions are, including some
10
    cause questions that are standard. So you do not have to
    re-suggest those. You should probably focus on questions that
11
12
    are unique to this case.
13
              Okay. Fida, you were going to say something?
14
              THE CLERK: Just that I think that covers
15
    everything.
16
              THE COURT: Oh, okay.
17
              So I think we are good.
18
              Anything else from you, Mr. Lesser?
19
              MR. LESSER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
20
                          Okay. And you, Mr. Kazan?
              THE COURT:
21
              MR. KAZAN:
                          Do we have a where the trial will be
22
    relative to Central Islip or Brooklyn?
23
              THE COURT:
                          Oh. Are you guys in Central Islip? I
24
    know the case was originally filed there and, unfortunately
25
    for you, either it got transferred to me or got assigned to me
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40
              MR. KAZAN:
1
                          Thank you, Judge.
 2
                            Thank you, Judge.
              MR. LESSER:
 3
              THE COURT:
                          You obviously have at least a year to
 4
    figure that out.
 5
              All right. If you folks decide -- if you change
    your mind about jury trial, you will let me know.
6
7
               If, for example, Mr. Kazan, you talk to Mr. Holmes
    and he decides he wants to get the case done this summer, we
8
9
    are available for that. Okay?
10
              MR. KAZAN:
                          Understood, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT:
                          All right. So thank you, everyone.
    That concludes this proceeding.
12
13
              Stay safe and have a good summer. We will hear from
14
    you I guess in about a year or so from now.
15
              MR. LESSER: Thank you so much, Your Honor. And you
16
    too and to your court staff, stay safe and best regards.
17
              THE COURT:
                           Thanks, everybody.
18
              MR. KAZAN:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
               (Matter concluded.)
19
20
21
    I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
    record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
22
23
        /s/ Andronikh M. Barna
                                            August 17, 2022
24
          ANDRONIKH M. BARNA
                                            DATE
25
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